Meet the Biden war budget, same as the Trump war budget, responsiblestatecraft.org

Andrew Lautz, director of Federal Policy for the National Taxpayers Union,

President Biden took a remarkably different approach than former President Trump when the two faced off on the 2020 presidential campaign trail, both in style and in substance. You would hardly know the difference between the two, though, solely based on the $777 billion defense policy bill President Biden signed into law two days after the Christmas holiday.

Organizations representing both progressive interests and more fiscally conservative perspectives had urged President Biden earlier this year to pull back on the huge defense budget increases that occurred during former President Trump’s four years in office. From the defense budget just before President Trump took office (fiscal year 2017) to the last one Trump signed into law (FY 2021), Department of Defense spending grew a staggering $98 billion, (or 16 percent). The DoD’s budget grew by $65 billion in Trump’s first year (+10.7 percent), $17 billion in his second year (+2.6 percent), and $35 billion (+5.1 percent) in his third year, before shrinking $19.5 billion (-2.7 percent) in his final year. What’s worse, that big $65 billion budget increase (and the $25 billion increase in President Obama’s final budget for fiscal year 2017) were approved by Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress, despite the GOP’s professed concern for fiscal responsibility. Läs artikel

How the U.S. could help prevent the Russia-Ukraine crisis from morphing into war, latimes.com

Rajan Menon, professor of international relations at City College of New York

[…] The second, less dangerous plan: creating a neutral Ukraine that won’t join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or become Russia’s ally. Those pushing this approach point to the May 1955 Austrian State Treaty. That accord led to the withdrawal of allied occupation forces (American, British, French and Russian) on the understanding that Austria would declare itself a neutral state, which its parliament did that October, once all foreign troops had departed. During the Cold War, Austria stayed out of NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact — and became a prosperous democracy as well.

Advocates of Ukrainian neutrality invoke other successful examples, such as Finland during the Cold War. “What’s not to like?” they ask, adding that Ukraine’s entry into NATO is a distant prospect in any event. Läs artikel

Inget genombrott i långt telefonsamtal mellan Biden och Putin – samma gamla hotelser från bägge sidor, svenska.yle.fi

USA:s president Joe Biden och Rysslands president Vladimir Putin talade med varandra sent på torsdag kväll om det spända läget vid gränsen mellan Ryssland och Ukraina. Presidenterna var nöjda med telefonsamtalet trots att man inte nådde något genombrott.

Det 50 minuter långa telefonsamtalet sågs som ett försök att förbereda regelrätta säkerhetsförhandlingar som USA och Ryssland inleder den 10 januari.

Därför väntade man sig inga genombrott då Biden och Putin talade med varandra på Putins initiativ. Biden och Putin upprepade tidigare kända ståndpunkter, om det spända läget vid gränsen mellan Ryssland och Ukraina, där Ryssland har koncentrerat omkring 100 000 soldater, enligt försvarsalliansen Nato. Läs artikel

Vänliga relationer stater emellan femtio år senare

Mats Björkenfeldt

Vi återpublicerar här en artikel från 7 oktober 2020.

För att fira FN-stadgans tjugofemårsjubileum 1970, antog FN:s generalförsamling Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (“Friendly Relations”). Förslaget till resolution antogs utan reservationer den 28 september 1970.

Deklarationen innehåller sju principer, varav de viktigaste är nr 1 och nr 3.

Nr 1: Principen att staterna i sina internationella förbindelser skall avhålla sig från hot om eller bruk av våld, vare sig riktat mot någon annan stats territoriella integritet eller politiska oberoende eller på annat sätt oförenligt med Förenta Nationernas ändamål.

Nr. 3: Principen rörande skyldigheten, i enlighet med stadgan, att inte ingripa i angelägenheter som faller inom annan stats egen behörighet.

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Choreographing A Pas De Deux: A Dutch Perspective On NATO’s (And The EU’s) Near Future,eurasiareview.com

Hugo Klijn, Senior ,research fellow at the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in the Hague

With regard to NATO, the Netherlands combines various capacities. As one of the Organisation’s founding members it has traditionally been considered a loyal ally. At some junctures it has also been a difficult member, for instance during the Euromissile crisis in the 1980s. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation remain priorities for the Netherlands, which participates in NATO’s nuclear sharing tasks with dual-capable fighter jets. […]

For the Netherlands, NATO remains central to its security policy and it will subscribe to the general gist of most, if not all, of the proposals enumerated in NATO 2030. Among these issues the rise of China, which features as a NATO topic since late 2019, will no doubt be a tough nut to crack for the Alliance, with the US insisting on the military nature of Beijing’s ascendancy whereas others are still not convinced –or may fear this categorisation will be at the expense of other, more pressing concerns, like Russia and terrorism–. The Netherlands (aware of the EU’s elaborate definition of China as partner-competitor-rival) will likely opt for the middle ground, and propose that China be looked upon as an unconventional challenger that should also be dealt with in cooperation with other institutions, such as the EU. The security implications of China’s technological edge are also mentioned as a topic for NATO to address. In this regard, the Netherlands has recently joined 16 other allies to lead a new NATO innovation fund –the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North-Atlantic (DIANA)–, although its initial budget of US$1 billion over a period of 15 years, as well as the absence of countries like the US and France, make for a rather modest start. Läs artikel

German Cabinet confirms plans for Moscow-Berlin talks, tass.com

The German Cabinet confirmed Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s advisor Jens Ploetner’s plans to hold negotiations with Russian Deputy Administration head Dmitry Kozak, Cabinet spokesman Wolfgang Buechner said Wednesday.

”There is a number of talks ahead. The first is planned between the US and Russia in Geneva,” he said, adding that the Russia-NATO Council may convene on January 12. ”Besides, bilateral negotiations between Russia and Germany have already been agreed upon – between the Chancellor’s foreign policy advisor Ploetner and Russia’s chief negotiator on Ukraine Kozak,” he said. Läs artikel

Veckans citat

”A month ago, the French authorities said that Wagner’s presence in Mali would be “incompatible”

with the retention of the French in Mali. But today, concretely, if Wagner arrives in Bamako, will the French close their base in Gao?

I note that in this official declaration of these 15 countries, including France, we condemn, but without threatening to withdraw. We don’t talk about it anymore.”

General Bruno Clément-Bollée, news.in-24.com, 29 december

A Million Afghan Children Could Starve This Winter: Are US Sanctions to Blame? thenation.com

[…] While the policies are aimed at isolating the Taliban, everyday Afghans are suffering. Banks are running out of cash. The price of everything from bread to fuel is shooting up. Imports have been crippled, and civil employees have gone months without being paid. President Joe Biden promised to promote human rights on the world stage, but his administration is now overseeing a sanctions regime that has pushed Afghanistan to the brink of famine. Barring major changes, over 1 million children could starve to death over the winter, according to the World Food Program, the food assistance branch of the United Nations.

Despite increasing calls to relax the sanctions, the Biden administration has shown few signs of changing course. Members of Congress have largely remained silent or voiced their support, with notable exceptions such as a group of 40 Democratic lawmakers who have urged Biden to unfreeze Afghan cash reserves.Läs artikel

Krig och idealism

Anders Björnsson

Vi lägger ut repriser under jul och nyårshelgerna.

Detta inlägg publicerades den 12 september 2021.

När idéer har styrt världspolitiken har det lett till katastrofer. Detta gäller inte bara förhållandet mellan det traditionella väst och öst, mellan det atlantiska Europa och det slaviska, utan även inom ett väst där två block har stått mot varandra, som senast under 1900-talets bägge världskrig. Det gäller också en framtida konfrontation mellan ett västerland och ett österland, med fokus i Stilla havet, där väderstrecken blir något omkastade. Retoriskt har detta beskrivits som en kamp mellan demokrati och despoti, när det i själva verket rör sig om en tävlan i ekonomisk och politisk hegemoni.

Det skulle vara ödesdigert, om sådana synsätt åter omsattes i militär praxis. Kalla kriget 1945–91 var på sätt och vis en undantagsperiod. Det var en systemkonflikt, men syftet var inte att förgöra utan att hålla tillbaka och stabilisera. Naturligtvis fanns på ömse sidor anfallsplaner, som – om de hade satts i verket – kunnat utplåna stora delar av jordens befolkning. Men poängen är, att äventyrslusten fick ge vika för politisk klokskap. De krig som utkämpades var i huvudsak koloniala befrielsekrig och militära angrepp på stater som slog in på en oberoende väg inom ramen för systemkonflikten.

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Strategic Ambiguity and the Risk of War With Russia over Ukraine,warontherocks.com

Ralph Clem,senior fellow at the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at Florida International University and Ray Finch, Eurasian military analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth

[…] The alliance has not made clear its strategic goals in the Black Sea region, especially as regards Ukraine. Vague references to “assurance” and “deterrence” and a modicum of in-country training programs and limited supplies of weaponry to Ukraine, if intended to make Moscow rethink its current actions, have clearly failed to affect its behavior. Further geopolitical messaging by NATO forces through deployments and exercises will likely remain ineffective over the long term. Although much of the national security commentary in the United States suggests a further expansion of the allied presence and an even higher operational tempo in the Black Sea region, we see this as a singularly bad idea. How such actions will convince Russia to ratchet down its own military operational messaging is unclear, with recent experience, as documented by our data, suggesting that it will almost certainly do the opposite. We recognize that, in some quarters, any attempt to reach a mutually satisfying agreement with Moscow at the operational level will be labeled as Munich-style “appeasement.” But doing nothing — or, worse, engaging yet more force posture — might lead to large-scale hostilities with truly horrific consequences. Läs artikel

Ny rysk-belarusisk militärövning planeras, svd.se

Rysslands president Vladimir Putin välkomnar Belarus president Aleksandr Lukasjenkos förslag om att genomföra gemensamma militärövningar i början av nästa år. Det meddelade han vid ett möte med Lukasjenko i S:t Petersburg på onsdagen.

Beskedet kommer samtidigt som Ryssland har ökat sin truppnärvaro vid gränsen till Ukraina. Tjänstemän i Ukraina har uttryckt oro över att Ryssland kan komma att attackera landet från Belarus. Läs artikel

Ut mot Stoltenberg – mener han bør roe ned konflikten, tv2.no

Tidligere NATO-ambassadør og topp-diplomat Kai Eide refser NATOs generalsekretær. Han mener situasjonen mellom NATO og Russland er farlig og at det nå er tid for å roe ned situasjonen. […]

NATOs generalsekretær Jens Stoltenberg har flere ganger advart mot situasjonen. Blant annet sa Stoltenberg på en pressekonferanse etter et møte med Romanias statsminister i Brüssel 21. desember at tiden for at stormaktene har egne interessesfærer er over.

Dette mener pensjonert diplomat Kai Eide er feil. Stoltenberg bruker en retorikk som ikke er helt heldig, sier Eide til TV 2.

– Når Stoltenberg sier at det ikke lengre er interessesfærer, så er dette feil. Det er klart det gjør. Og alle stormakter opererer til enhver tid med interessesfære-politikk. Det gjør USA, det gjør Kina, det gjør Russland. La oss ta det innover oss og ikke late som vi befinner oss i en verden der dette ikke er tilfelle, sier Eide til TV 2. Läs artikel