Månad: februari 2022

Rysslands stegrande aggressivitet bottnar i olika uppfattningar om verkligheten. Det är grundproblemet i all internationell politik, säger ambassadören Klaus Törnudd som iakttagit världspolitiken i över 60 år.

Hotet om ett krig hänger över Ukraina och västmakterna håller andan. Men toppdiplomaten Klaus Törnudd har svårt att tro på ett öppet krig i Europa.

– Det passar överhuvudtaget inte ihop med världsläget just nu. Dessutom skulle det vara ett klart brott mot folkrätten. Ett storskaligt krig med moderna vapen är en fruktansvärd tanke, säger Törnudd. […]

Det spända läget i Ukraina har än en gång hettat upp diskussionen om Nato. Bland annat samhällsdebattören Risto E.J. Penttilä förespråkade ett finländskt Natomedlemskap i ett tidigare avsnitt av Daniel Olin.

Men i Klaus Törnudds öron låter det inte som en bra idé. Finland är inte utsatt för ett sådant krigshot att man skulle behöva höja tröskeln för ett eventuellt angrepp, säger han.

För övrigt skulle inte ett Natomedlemskap höja den tröskeln.

– Det skulle ändå vara Finlands sak att själv försvara sitt eget område. Natos insatser skulle inte vara särskilt märkliga, kanske bara några flyg. Inte skulle några stora marktrupper ställa upp.

Varför tror du det? I artikel 5 lovar ju Nato ett kollektivt försvar.

– Varifrån skulle de trupperna komma? Inte har Nato några sådana trupper i Europa som de plötsligt skulle skicka hit. Hur och när skulle de hinna hit?

– Vi skulle bara förvandlas till ett irritationsmoment och en frontlinjestat för Ryssland. Det tycker jag är ganska onödigt. Läs intervjun

At the invitation of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin visited China on 4 February 2022. […]

The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as the sides, state as follows.

Today, the world is going through momentous changes, and humanity is entering a new era of rapid development and profound transformation. It sees the development of such processes and phenomena as multipolarity, economic globalization, the advent of information society, cultural diversity, transformation of the global governance architecture and world order; there is increasing interrelation and interdependence between the States; a trend has emerged towards redistribution of power in the world; and the international community is showing a growing demand for the leadership aiming at peaceful and gradual development. At the same time, as the pandemic of the new coronavirus infection continues, the international and regional security situation is complicating and the number of global challenges and threats is growing from day to day. Some actors representing but the minority on the international scale continue to advocate unilateral approaches to addressing international issues and resort to force; they interfere in the internal affairs of other states, infringing their legitimate rights and interests, and incite contradictions, differences and confrontation, thus hampering the development and progress of mankind, against the opposition from the international community.

The sides call on all States to pursue well-being for all and, with these ends, to build dialogue and mutual trust, strengthen mutual understanding, champion such universal human values as peace, development, equality, justice, democracy and freedom, respect the rights of peoples to independently determine the development paths of their countries and the sovereignty and the security and development interests of States, to protect the United Nations-driven international architecture and the international law-based world order, seek genuine multipolarity with the United Nations and its Security Council playing a central and coordinating role, promote more democratic international relations, and ensure peace, stability and sustainable development across the world. […]

The sides believe that certain States, military and political alliances and coalitions seek to obtain, directly or indirectly, unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of others, including by employing unfair competition practices, intensify geopolitical rivalry, fuel antagonism and confrontation, and seriously undermine the international security order and global strategic stability. The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches, to respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds, and to exercise a fair and objective attitude towards the peaceful development of other States. The sides stand against the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region and remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy on peace and stability in the region. Russia and China have made consistent efforts to build an equitable, open and inclusive security system in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) that is not directed against third countries and that promotes peace, stability and prosperity . […]

The Chinese side is sympathetic to and supports the proposals put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe. Läs uttalandet

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter reads: ” All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” […]

Russian behaviour fulfils all the elements of the violation. Given the timing, the geographical location, the exceptional nature of the manoeuvres in which an intervention is being played out, one may credibly infer that Russia is declaring its willingness to use force to achieve concrete political goals […]

If Russia intervenes militarily, Ukraine would be entitled to defend itself. It could also request assistance from other States. Military action in exercise of the collective right of self-defence is lawful provided it meets further conditions. In particular, the response would have to be proportionate.

As a side note, a mere border skirmish would still not entitle Ukraine (and allies) to self-defence. Although Russia would already violate the ban on the use of force with minor incursions, there would not yet be an “armed attack” in the technical sense that would trigger the right to self-defence under the UN Charter. This gap between the prohibition of violence and the right of self-defence means that low-level violence must be accepted by the victim State.

However, it is difficult to assess the preceding threat solely on the basis of a backward projection of the legitimacy of a (hypothetical) military response. It remains speculative how Western military powers would react. They would only be entitled to (collective) self-defence if a Russian armed attack were imminent or already underway. It would not be permissible to take “pre-emptive” action, for example, on the basis of intelligence information without objective indications. Such an anticipation of the right of self-defence has been claimed by the USA, especially in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, but was not accepted by the community of states. However, there is a grey area of lawful self-defence against imminent armed attacks. Läs artikel

It is fifty years since the start of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Brandt was a peculiar figure in contemporary history. Brandt’s dropping to his knees in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in 1970 is one of the most iconic gestures of modern European history. In 1971, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to peace and security. His statecraft created a new quality of international relations. His Ostpolitik was aimed at the emergence of a united Germany and a Europe whole and free. His objective was to “reunite what belongs together” as he famously said when the Berlin Wall came down on November 9, 1989. Ostpolitik helped to lay the seeds of democracy in the Warsaw Pact countries.

Brandt’s aim was to encourage the slow and difficult process of Eastern Europe’s reassociation with the rest of the world. Ostpolitik and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 turned freedom and openness into the pivotal principles of Europe’s security. The Final Act’s provisions on human rights and the freer movement of people, information, and ideas turned into the ferment for a transnational network of dissidents, human rights activists, and peace movements that challenged Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union until its demise. Willy Brandt had envisioned this dynamic Helsinki effect: He believed in soft power and in the ability to facilitate liberalizing changes in the societies of Eastern Europe. Läs artikel

Before you being to read this story, you may wish to look up the Russian naval base at Gadzhiyevo in Russia’s Arctic northwest on Google Earth.

This will help to illustrate why Norway is particularly worried about the current standoff with Russia over Ukraine and the prospect of a possible armed conflict there.

At Gadzhiyevo, and at the main naval base of Severomorsk — which are both very close to Norway — one can zoom in directly on the nuclear submarines and naval vessels of Russia’s Northern Fleet. They are blurry but visible like steely eels to anyone with a laptop. […]

To understand the underlying currents, I called Tormod Heier, a lieutenant colonel who serves as a professor at the Norwegian Defense Command and Staff College and knows intimately the depth of Norway’s worries:

“Luckily, we are not at that point yet, but the Norwegian authorities fear that in the event of a war in Europe that involves a NATO country, Russia will move troops into northern Norway and onto (the Norwegian islands of) Svalbard, Bear Island and Jan Mayen because Russia will need greater strategic depth and room to shoot down U.S. missiles before they hit the base complexes on the Kola Peninsula or the government structures in Moscow,” Heier explains. Läs artikel

Byretten i København skal i dag ta stilling til om varetektsfengslingen av sjefen for det danske forsvarets etterretningstjeneste, Lars Findsen, skal forlenges.

Findsen ble pågrepet 8. desember, siktet for å ha lekket statshemmeligheter. Han har sittet i varetekt siden. Fredag utløper varetekten, og retten må derfor ta stilling til om han skal løslates, eller om det da er fare for bevisforspillelse.

Fredagens rettsmøte finner sted bak såkalt dobbeltlukkede dører, noe også det forrige rettsmøtet gjorde. Det er derfor ikke kjent hvilke opplysninger Findsen er siktet for å ha lekket, eller til hvem.

Etter rettsmøtet 10. januar sa Findsen til journalister at han nekter straffskyld og omtalte siktelsen som «vanvittig»

Siktelsen mot ham faller inn under den svært alvorlige bestemmelsen om «landsforræderi» i den danske straffeloven, som kan straffes med opptil tolv års fengsel. Paragrafen har ikke vært i bruk på 40 år i Danmark. Läs artikel

– Norge fungerer som et hangarskip for USA. Styrker det vår sikkerhet at vi blir en plattform for militær kampkraft mot Russland?

Det spurte Rødt-politiker Bjørnar Moxnes i forbindelse med at sentrale norske forsvarspolitikere møttes torsdag ettermiddag for å diskutere problemstillinger rundt utviklingen av Forsvaret.

Debatten ble innledet av lederen av den nye forsvarskommisjonen, Knut Storberget. Han startet med å gå gjennom de viktigste utviklingstrendene i sikkerhetspolitikken de siste tiårene. Deretter satte han fokuset mot de sikkerhetspolitiske veivalgene Norge må ta videre. […]

Hun (Ingrid Fiskaa SV, vår anm.),   peker blant annet på forslaget det hun betegner som «baseavtalen med USA», som blant annet medfører at amerikanerne får økt tilstedeværelse i Norge. Avtalen skal behandles i Stortinget til våren.

– Vi kan ta en større del av oppgavene selv, så vi ikke slipper USA stadig nærmere grensen til Russland, og dermed bidrar til å fyre opp under stormaktsrivaliseringen, mener hun. Läs artikel