Christmas Day Cable Cuts in the Baltic Sea, ejiltalk.org

Alexander Lott, researcher at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea at the UiT

In less than 14 months, submarine telecommunications cables connecting Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden have been cut nine times in the Baltic Sea. In addition, an underwater electricity cable and a gas pipeline have been cut by a ship anchor. These damages occurred in three separate incidents all involving a foreign commercial ship dragging an anchor on the seafloor for over a hundred kilometres. […]

As the Eagle S continued the anchor-dragging and sailed westward, the Finnish Defence Forces and Coast Guard intervened off Helsinki and Tallinn (see Map 1). They used a patrol ship and two helicopters to stop and board the Cook Islands-flagged Eagle S, forming part of the Russian sanctions-busting ‘shadow fleet’. The ship was stopped just before it would have crossed the ESTLINK 1 electricity cable, the Balticconnector gas pipeline, and other underwater cables. […]

The special forces (Karhu) of the Finnish Defence Forces and the Coast Guard boarded the ship from two helicopters and took command of the Eagle S after the ship had entered the Finnish territorial sea (see Map 2). The Finnish President Mr. Alexander Stubb confirmed that the ship was boarded in the Finnish territorial sea. […]

It is unclear whether Finland consulted with the flag State prior to interdicting the ship. In any event, the flag State consent to board and seize the ship was not required as the Finnish laws were enforced only after the ship had agreed to enter the Finnish territorial sea. Yet, notably, according to the Finnish press report, the Finnish authorities were ready to take measures against the ship even if it had not agreed to enter the Finnish territorial sea. In this time-critical situation, this would have been necessary to avoid damages to the ESTLINK 1 electricity cable, the Balticconnector gas pipeline, and to the other submarine data cables (see Map 1). […]

The Finnish criminal jurisdiction can be exercised on the grounds of the damage caused to the submarine cables and, possibly, for violating the European Union (EU) sanctions. The EU has prohibited the shipments of Russia’s oil to non-EU countries, unless these products are being sold in accordance with the oil price cap. The violation of the sanctions is a crime at the EU level. Läs artikel

Status Report on the Iron Ore Line Derailment: Could Have Been Caused by Defective Wheel, highnorthnews.com

The derailment on the Iron Ore Line in December last year may have been caused by a defective wheel.

This was stated by the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority. The final report is scheduled for March 2025.

A loaded iron ore train heading from Kiruna in Northern Sweden to Narvik in Northern Norway derailed near the Norwegian border with several cars. There were no injuries, but the derailment led to significant damage to infrastructure, such as rails, sleepers, and overhead lines. […]

The report reveals that a wheel is to have derailed while the trail was still in motion. The more extensive derailment occurred 15 kilometers later with several derailed axles and cars.

The investigators found an axle with a loose, damaged wheel under the derailed cars. According to the report, the wheel broke, then moved toward the axle and derailed.

A crack on the back of the wheel flange is a likely contributor. The cause of this is still under investigation. Läs artikel

 

The rise and fall of Sweden’s nuclear disarmament advocacy, thebulletin.org

In the nine months since joining NATO, Sweden has not wasted any time integrating itself tightly into the transatlantic alliance. On September 16, Sweden doubled down on its commitment to a nuclear weapons-based military alliance when Sweden and Finland agreed that Sweden would lead a new NATO defense base to be established in northern Finland.

While Denmark and Norway currently do not want to host nuclear weapons on their own soil, NATO’s new entrants have both signaled an openness to doing so. In June, the Swedish parliament ratified a Defense Cooperation Agreement granting the United States access to 17 Swedish military bases, and Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson did not rule out hosting nuclear weapons during wartime. Meanwhile, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb has advocated for a legislative change to allow the transportation of nuclear weapons.

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it is clear that this was not an inevitable outcome. Sweden was once a nuclear aspirant with an advanced weapons program, but just a few decades ago, Stockholm and Helsinki sought to keep nuclear weapons out of northern Europe. In the depths of the Cold War, Stockholm proved willing and capable of advancing ambitious, albeit inconsistent, goals when it came to nuclear weapons in Europe. Sweden’s history suggests that disarmament ideas—such as a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone—were never completely written off, even if they are difficult to imagine in Europe today. Läs artikel

The Evolution of Baltic Military Divisions, fpri.org

Lukas Milevski, Assistant Professor at Leiden University

Ten years ago in 2014, Baltic defense was paltry. The defense budgets of the three Baltic states, but especially Latvia and Lithuania, were suffering from the financial crisis of 2008, and their armies were all negligible. Baltic defense was measured in battalions of about 400-1,000 men, while trying to form brigade-sized forces of 3,000-5,000. Alliance contributions were minimal. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Crimea, the US deployed mere companies to the Baltic states; after the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw Summits, NATO finally deployed battalion-sized battlegroups. […]

Estonia, the smallest of the Baltic states, has been in the process of establishing its own — purely Estonian — division since December 2022. Its order of battle comprises two relatively light infantry brigades, a headquarters and signal battalion, and artillery, logistics, and ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) battalions. The second infantry brigade is as yet incomplete and would have to be filled with reservists in case of war, while the first brigade is rather more substantial and organically includes even air defense and engineer battalions, as well as an anti-tank company. It is anticipated that in the event of war in the Baltic, one British armored brigade combat team (either 12th or 20th) from the British 3rd Division would also be deployed to Estonia under the operational command of the 1st Estonian Division, besides other NATO enhanced forward presence units in the country.

Unlike its northern and southern neighbors, Latvia does not aim to field a national division but already since 2019 has instead contributed to a multinational division, MND North, with Denmark and Estonia, and has remained committed to it. It is therefore the oldest division set up for Baltic defense and as such its headquarters were certified by NATO as operationally ready in July 2023. However, its force structure does not appear to be publicly available. It should include two brigades, the Latvian mechanized infantry brigade and the Canadian-led enhanced forward presence brigade, the latter of which should achieve full brigade-level operationally-ready status by 2026. Yet MND North has additionally become the formal affiliation of the 1st Danish Brigade, which is gearing up to be operationally ready, but it is still unclear how this brigade may eventually fit into divisional operations in Baltic defense, if at all.  Läs artikel

Läs också kommentar till beslutet att skicka en svensk bataljon till Lettland.

China Escorts Swedish Police During Boarding of Suspected Sabotage Ship, maritime-executive.com

After weeks of negotiations with the government of China, Swedish police have received permission to board the Chinese bulker Yi Peng 3, which is suspected of intentionally dragging its anchor to sever two subsea cables in the Baltic last month. However, they have not been allowed to question the crew independently: Swedish officials are only present as observers during a Chinese-led flag state boarding and investigation.

Yi Peng 3 has been anchored in the Kattegat since November 18, just outside of Danish territorial seas. Since it is in international waters, Danish officials have no authority to board the ship unless they have strong evidence of a Danish EEZ violation, like illegal fishing – but the cable breaks occurred in the Swedish EEZ, far from Danish waters. Instead, the Yi Peng 3 remained at anchor, guarded by Danish and German law enforcement vessels.

German, Danish and Swedish authorities all want the crew to be questioned, but they have opted to pursue a strictly legal route. Rather than conduct an opposed boarding, they negotiated for permission to board from the vessel’s flag state – China. Chinese authorities engaged in diplomatic discussions, but declined to cooperate with a Swedish law-enforcement boarding until this week. The boarding was Chinese-led, and Swedish police were only present as observers, even though the alleged offense occurred in the Swedish EEZ. Läs artikel

Finland Seizes Russian Oil Tanker After Suspected Undersea Fiber-Optic Cable Sabotage, news.usni.org

Finnish authorities seized the Russian oil tanker Eagle S after the country’s police opened a criminal investigation into the vessel’s possible involvement in another cutting of undersea power and communications cables in the Baltic Sea on Christmas Day, news agencies are reporting.

Finnish police and border guards boarded the vessel and took over the command bridge, Helsinki Police Chief Jari Liukku told a news conference. The vessel was held in Finnish territorial waters, police told The Associated Press, as it investigates the matter as a case of “aggravated criminal mischief.”

Politico reported that the tanker carried 35,000 tons of unleaded petrol that had been loaded in Russian ports. It slowed significantly at the time the submarine cable, known as Estlink 2, was damaged.

An anchor dragged across the cables may have caused the damage.

Four other telecommunications cables between Finland and Estonia and between Finland and Germany were also damaged in the Christmas Day incident involving the tanker that was bound for Egypt. Läs artikel

Pope Francis calls for a ceasefire on all fronts in his prayer ahead of Christmas, apnews.com

Pope Francis called for a ceasefire on all war fronts in his Sunday Angelus prayer ahead of Christmas, condemning the “cruelty” of bombing schools and hospitals in Ukraine and Gaza.

“Let the weapons fall silent and let the Christmas carols ring out!” Francis said, delivering his Sunday blessing from indoors due to a cold and as a precaution ahead of a busy Christmas period.

“Let us pray that at Christmas there will be a ceasefire on all war fronts, in Ukraine, in the Holy Land, throughout the Middle East and throughout the world,” the pope said.

Francis recalled, as he often does, the “battered Ukraine” that continues to be hit by attacks on cities, “which sometimes damage schools, hospitals and churches.”

He also expressed his pain thinking of Gaza, “of such cruelty, to the machine-gunning of children, to the bombing of schools and hospitals … How much cruelty!” Läs artikel

Från defensiv strategi för försvaret av Sverige till offensiv strategi för internationella insatser med ökad risk för involvering i andras krig

Utgivarna

Inriktningen på försvars- och säkerhetspolitikens område läggs nu om i ett uppskruvat tempo. Det sker med vägval som inte självständigt styrs av Sverige utan strömlinjeformas och får sin prägel inom ramarna för Natos operativa planeringsprocess och den löpande implementeringen av DCA-avtalet. Sveriges ÖB Michael Claesson formulerade nyligen i en intervju problematiken så här: ”… för att vi ska se exakt vad som behövs ur ett internationellt perspektiv, vad vi i grunden själva behöver och hur vi får det här att lira ihop”.

Flera saker är slående i den nu pågående omgörningen.

Förvaret av Sverige ska inte längre utgöra grunden för det svenska försvaret

Sverige försvaras numera, heter det ofta, bäst utomlands. Det är emellertid inte Afghanistan, Libyen eller Mali som längre gäller. Insatserna i dessa långt bort liggande länder är överspelade kapitel. Det är även den korta period då fokus åtminstone ideologiskt sett låg på nationellt försvar (men då inte mycket blev gjort i praktiken).

I och med medlemskapet i Nato och DCA-avtalet med USA har pendeln svängt och vi går nu ”all-in” som statsministern nyligen förklarade. Delar av armén flyttas utomlands för operationer i de Baltiska staterna (med början i Lettland), i Finland, kanske i Polen, möjligen även i den indo-pacifiska regionen samt i andra operationsområden som i dagsläget inte är kända men kommer att konkretiseras genom Natos planeringsprocess av de svenska ”förmågebidragen”. Flottan och flygvapnet får nya uppgifter som sträcker sig långt utanför Sveriges gränser.

Läs mer

Northern Fleet’s newest Yasen-M class submarine will be based 60 km from NATO Norway, thebarentsobserver.com

“Today is a significant day for the entire Navy,” Commander-in-Chief Admiral Aleksandr Moiseev said at the official ceremony that took place on Friday.

The Arkhangelsk is the forth of the Yasen-M class built in Severodvinsk. Two are already sailing for the Pacific Fleet, while the third, the Kazan, belongs to the Northern Fleet. Including the prototype vessel of the Yasen class, the Severodvinsk, the new Arkhangelsk will be the third of the class deployed with the Northern Fleet.

Yasen and Yasen-M class are 4th generation multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines in the Russia navy. The Arkhangelsk (K-562) was rolled out of the ship hall at Sevmash in late November last year and has spent the last 13 months on sea trials, including navigation and weapons testings in the White Sea and Barents Sea.

Admiral Moiseev praised the onboard weapons systems and said they are “capable of hitting both sea and coast targets.”

The Yasen-M class can carry Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles, but more important for the navy is arming these new submarines with the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, a weapon key for Russia in the ongoing naval arms race with NATO. Läs artikel

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Russian and international news media, Moscow, December 26, 2024, mid.ru

Question:Talks are the top priority, no question about it. Many opinions are heard coming from the diplomatic circles, experts, and other sources. To put it in plain terms, they are trying hard to see both of us make peace. The question is, though, who are we supposed to talk to in Kiev? President-elect Trump’s presumptive special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg has come up with an initiative. What’s your take on the situation?

Sergey Lavrov:Much has been said on this subject. President Putin has repeatedly addressed this issue, including during the Direct Line and during the Valdai International Discussion Club meeting before that, as well as other events.

Empty talk is not an option for us. Everything we have heard so far was rhetoric about the need to come up with some kind of a ceasefire. However, not much is done to hide the fact that the purpose of a ceasefire is to buy time and to flood Ukraine with weapons, to help it get back in shape, to carry out additional mobilisation, and so on.

Ceasefire is a road leading nowhere. We need binding legal agreements that will lay out the conditions for ensuring Russia’s security and the legitimate security interests of our neighbours. However, they should exist in an international legal context that would preclude chances of violating these agreements. These agreements must address Ukraine crisis’ root causes. The two main ones include, first, the violation of the commitments not to expand NATO to the east and the aggressive absorption by NATO of the geopolitical space all the way up to our borders. This is what they had in store for Ukraine. They keep talking about it to this day. The second root cause includes the Kiev regime’s absolutely racist actions following the coup. The extermination of everything Russian, including language, mass media, culture, and even the use of the Russian language in everyday life, was officially greenlighted and then codified into law. Of course, that includes outlawing the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Läs intervjun

Risks of Military Confrontation in Arctic Increasing, Say U.S. and Russian Officials, usni.org

The Arctic is “where the confrontation of the world’s leading states is unfolding,” the head of the Russian Navy said at a recent forum in St. Petersburg where regional cooperation had traditionally dominated the agenda.

“In addition to political and economic measures to contain Russia in the Arctic, unfriendly states are increasing their military presence in the region,” said Adm. Aleksandr Moiseev, who took command of the Russian Navy in March. He specifically mentioned the United States’ re-establishing the Second Fleet in 2018 and the 2021 creation of NATO’s Joint Force Command in Norfolk.

Moissev said one reason for the rise in tensions has been Moscow’s suspension from the eight-member Arctic Council, following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the placing of economic sanctions on Russian financial institutions, businesses and individuals.

The other seven nations in the forum are NATO members.

He added that updated Arctic strategies, including the United States, “enshrine an anti-Russian focus and also allow for the thesis that the nationalization of the Northern Sea Route by the Russian Federation is inadmissible. Also, unfriendly states are increasing their military presence in the region.” […]

Left unchecked, Russia “wants to claim the Arctic as theirs,” Adm. Daryle Caudle, Fleet Forces commander, said during a recent online Navy League event. He and Moiseev were reflecting on the new dynamics in the region. Examples include Canada which has re-evaluated its High North Strategy and foreign policy, China has shown increasing economic and military interest in the region and new Scandinavian allies reminding NATO look north to a major threat to the alliance’s security.

Caudle, speaking as the component commander for Northern Command, said, “my goal is for the Navy to have a footprint there” with the capabilities to operate in a region where navigation systems are under stress and communications difficult.

He added, “we have a team up there” to contain Russian’s Arctic ambitions. He was referring to allies like the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Finland. He specifically mentioned the Harry S. Truman carrier strike group conducting joint operations with Royal Navy carrier strike groups in October in the North Sea as an example of regional allied cooperation

“We want to do things on the surface,” not just with submarines in the Arctic and northern waters. Caudle added, “I’m all behind” the recently signed memorandum of understanding between the United States, Canada and Finland to build icebreakers. Called ICE Pact, “what I would like to see is them delivered” to demonstrate year-round presence. Läs artikel

Defense Cooperation Agreements in northern Europe: Strengthening the United States’ global position, transatlantic relations, and regional deterrence and defense, fiia.fi

Charly Salonius-Pasternak, forskare global säkerhet och styrning
The United States now has bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreements with all five Nordic countries – Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland – as well as with other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, extending down to the Black Sea. These agreements enhance the military effectiveness of the political alliance commitment provided by NATO membership. They facilitate the development of certain defense-related infrastructure, such as the prepositioning of equipment, and promote more effective cooperation in terms of training, capability development, and defense and deterrence operations. […]
To understand why the United States wanted to sign these additional defense cooperation agreements with all Nordic countries – each involving explicit additional commitments – it is essential to adopt the perspective of a global power with a network of partners and allies, and multiple overlapping and competing interests and commitments. From the US perspective, these recent DCAs contribute to its own security and strengthen its security commitments in at least four different ways.
First, the Defense Cooperation Agreements significantly increase tactical and operational options for deterrence and defense. US and regional military planners are no longer as constrained by national borders, allowing plans to fully utilize dozens of basing options and the prepositioning of equipment. This can increase the resilience, speed, and effect of any deterrence or defense operation. The string of DCAs across NATO’s eastern flank, which the 2024 NATO Summit identified as facing “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security”, allows the United States and its Allies to create additional problems for Russian military planners. For example, by using long-range precision strike weapons to put Russian war-making assets at immediate risk from Murmansk to the Black Sea and from Kaliningrad to the Ural Mountains.
The DCAs enable the United States to draw up better plans, make preparations and, if necessary, conduct immediate operational-level deterrence and defense efforts at a sub-regional level with Nordic and Baltic Allies. This should alleviate concerns among countries south of the Baltic Sea about all Nordic countries eventually joining the Joint Force Command in Norfolk. The DCAs effectively help ‘sew up the seams’ between different NATO commands and defense plans. Läs artikel