Litteratur

Nylig kom historiker og professor emeritus ved Norges arktiske universitet – Tom Kristiansen – ut med en ny bok. Kristiansen er blant landets fremste militærhistorikere, med mellomkrigstiden og 2. verdenskrig som spesialfelt.

Carl Gustav Fleischer var den norske helten fra Narvik. Ifølge standardfortellingen, som Kristiansen korrigerer nokså mye på, var Fleischer ikke bare generalen som ikke bøyde av for tyskerne, men som påførte tyskerne deres første nederlag i krigen ved å frigjøre Narvik fra tyskernes okkupasjon. Senere ble han tvunget med i eksil til Storbritannia, forbigått i utnevnelsen som forsvarssjef da regjeringen re-innførte det embetet tidlig i 1942, før han så tok sitt eget liv i skam i desember 1942 i Canada. […]

Han nyskriver på sett og vis Fleischers historie ved å vise at generalen på tampen av felttoget og i eksil gjorde tre grove feilvurderinger; 1) den første ved å protestere hardt (og lenge) da regjeringen (og general Otto Ruge) la om kommando-ordningen da de kom til Nord-Norge, slik at Fleischer ble mer direkte underlagt Forsvarssjef Ruge; 2) dernest ved å sende et notat direkte til Kongen før han og regjeringen dro i eksil der Fleischer argumenterte for at Kongen og regjeringen ikke burde dra, men heller forhandle fram en fredsordning med tyskerne. I notatet som Fleischer altså ikke sendte tjenestevei, men direkte til Kongen, hevdet han at Kongen og regjeringen ved å dra i eksil kunne miste sin rettmessige rolle som Norges Konge og regjering; 3) dernest ved å protestere en rekke ganger på eksil-regjeringens prioritering av Handelsflåten, Marinen og flyvåpnene fremfor Hæren, som Fleischer mente heller ikke burde drive med sabotasjeaksjoner (i form av blant annet det kjente Lingekompaniet). Läs anmälan

First published in 1939, ’Diplomacy’ is the best — and best written — book in English on the practice, principles and qualities. […]

A formative role in his views on diplomacy was played by the Versailles Peace Conference, which he attended and which is described vividly in his book “Peacemaking 1919.” This experience left him with an abiding hatred of petty and narrow nationalisms; of policies of national revenge; and of the pursuit of ideology in international affairs. His portrait of President Woodrow Wilson (“a theocrat”) is not wholly unsympathetic, but it is still damning:

“His spiritual arrogance, the hard but narrow texture of his mind, is well illustrated by his apparent unawareness of [foreign] political reality…He informed the members of his delegation in a solemn address delivered on board the USS George Washington that not only would America be the only disinterested nation at the Conference, but that he himself was the only plenipotentiary possessed of a full mandate from the people.” Läs presentationen

A very welcome addition to their ranks is Ian Proud, economic counsellor in the British Embassy in Moscow from 2014-2019. A highly experienced diplomat, Proud served in Thailand and Afghanistan, organized the G8 summit in Belfast in 2013 and, in 2022, retired from the Foreign Office as Vice Principal of its International Academy — the body charged with the foreign-language training of British diplomats. Perhaps his finest hour was the part he played in the smooth running of the football World Cup in Russia in 2018, when tens of thousands of English soccer fans descended on Moscow and other match venues.

Unlike the vast majority of his colleagues in Moscow, Proud took the trouble to learn Russian and to travel the country far and wide, meeting officials, politicians, academics, students and ordinary people.

A self-professed “realist,” Proud believes the core purpose of diplomacy is to manage relations between states and to prevent conflict. In Moscow, according to his memoir published late last year, “A Misfit in Moscow: How British Diplomacy in Russia Failed, 2014-2019, he was appalled by the “utmost folly” of attempting to resolve “disputes with Russia through isolation and cancellation.” […]

Proud claims that Moscow had to real interest in implementing Minsk either, but it seems to this reviewer that the public record shows Russia was probably the only party to those agreements acting in good faith. Certainly, in run-up to the Russian invasion, Putin was incessant in his insistence that implementation of Minsk was the only way to resolve the Ukrainian crisis peacefully. Läs presentationen

[…] In view of the above, if China does decide to resort to force against Taiwan, it is certain that it will not consider its operations as regulated by jus contra bellum. Whether the US will indeed assist Taiwan militarily on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter remains to be seen. It has been suggested that in case China attacks Taiwan, the US could proceed to formal recognition of Taiwan as a State and then resort to military action that would be lawful under the collective exercise of Taiwan’s right to self-defence (Fisher, 2020: 145). As the previous analysis and the reactions to Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk show, it is highly doubtful that recognition will be the decisive argument in making such a resort to force lawful under jus contra bellum. The legality of the resort to force on either side will revolve around the question of whether Taiwan is a State not on whether the States involved in the conflict have recognized Taiwan as a State.

Den sociale lim

af Jørgen Rossini er medredaktør af ”www.mankujoosse.dk”, der især behandler organisationsteoretiske fænomener

For nogen tid siden fik jeg en stabel bøger på dansk fra dødsboet efter en af mine gamle venner. Deriblandt var også Grimbergs Verdenshistorie, som jeg vist aldrig fik læst den gang for mange år siden, da min mor købte dem. Grimberg stod temmelig uberørt i reolen igennem alle årene, og hvad der siden skete med dem, husker jeg ikke længere. […]

Staten blev for gennemsnitsatheneren næppe andet end den store understøttelsesbetaler og festarrangør, og at risikere livet for den havde man ikke mere lyst til. Den almindelige værnepligts forsvinden til fordel for et forsvar baseret på lejesoldater, er et af denne materialistiske tids mest markante forfaldssymptomer. Nu var det ikke længere borgerhære, som kæmpede for by og hjem, men i farens stund afgjordes statens skæbne af en sammenskrabet flok hjemløse eventyrere, hvis troskab og pålidelighed strakte sig akkurat så langt, som der var penge i kassen.

Så dybt var det gamle borgersind sunket, at alle råbte på rettigheder, men ingen ville høre tale om pligter. Underslæb og korruption hørte til dagens orden inden for forvaltningen. Man indsatte kontrolkommissioner i det uendelige, men hvad hjalp det, når kontrollanterne kunne bestikkes. En overgang troede man, at man kunne genopvække samfundsånden med nye love, og et sandt lovgivningsraseri tog sin begyndelse.  Läs artikel

The book Dying by the Sword: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy by Monica Duffy Toft and Sidita Kushi is a historical account of the American military interventions abroad from 1776 till today. Notably, the book highlights that since the end of the Cold War and especially post-9/11, the US military interventions abroad have increased. Unlike the past when use of force was considered as the last resort, the US pursues a security policy known as ‘whack-a-mole’ which is more reactionary than deliberate, lacking clear strategic goals (p. 5).

The book comprises seven chapters and is a prominent reading on understanding the American imperialism. In the initial two chapters, the authors discuss different era of American expansionism providing a captivating journey of diplomatic events leading to a shift in American foreign policy. The authors argue that America’s early expansionism was driven by the powerful ideology of “Manifest Destiny” as well as domestic interests in maintaining the corrosive institution of slavery (p. 37). In 19^th century, the US devoted much of its military power to waging war against American Indians and expanding itself westward through military interventionism (p. 43). The US also exercised its power beyond the continent during the early period of expansionism with its involvement in Haitian Revolution and the Barbary Wars (p. 49). Läs presentationen

Recenserad bok: De hemliga rapporterna från MoskvaFrån Ryssland 1994 till kriget i Ukraina 2022

In the shadow of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East it is challenging to imagine a farewell to wars. Hans Blix’s latest book surveys modern international relations, and with the critical mind of a lawyer and diplomatic practitioner, demonstrates how, over the last two centuries, the international system has accepted growing constraints on interstate use of force.  […]

A Farewell to Wars is a timely contribution to the debate in Australia, and elsewhere, of the relative weight to be accorded to diplomacy in the promotion of national and international security. Blix is from the realist school and acknowledges the contributions of deterrence to global restraints on the use of force. But he makes a compelling case for a greater focus on diplomacy and détente, both to reduce security threats and to build structures and norms to further limit the use of violence, and to contain international competition within agreed boundaries. Blix book pairs well with an interview he gave to Greta Stocklassa in 2023. Läs rcensionen

Putin,  Philip Short

The Russo-Ukrainian war is Putin’s war. Putin took the decision to invade Ukraine. He is the one who will decide how far the Russian army penetrates into Ukraine and how and when the war will end.

To understand the war’s causes, course, and consequences, we need to get inside Putin’s head. Philip Short’s is by far the best Putin biography. What impressed me most was Short’s dedication to avoiding stereotypes and telling Putin’s amazing story as truthfully as he could.

Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, Richard Sakwa

The Ukraine crisis began in 2014 with the popular ”Maidan” uprising that toppled the country’s pro-Russian president. Russia’s seizure of the Crimean peninsula was followed by civil war and the takeover by pro-Russian rebels of Eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Sakwa focuses on the international factors that exacerbated internal splits within Ukraine. Crucially, the crisis might have been avoided altogether if the United States, EU, and NATO had found a way to incorporate Russia into the post-Cold War order in Europe that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution, Nicolai N. Petro

Nicolai Petro uses classical Greek tragedy to analyse the internal Ukrainian divisions that eventually led to war with Russia. As Petro points out, Greek drama was a means of reconciliation as well as entertainment and was designed to foster civic dialogue about the roots of conflict situations and the dangers of disaster for all concerned.

Petro remains hopeful, if not optimistic, that all Ukrainians, freed from malevolent foreign influences, can ameliorate their deep differences about their country’s preferred identity and find a way to co-exist with each other. Läs presentationerna