Historians, used to slow-burning research projects, have so far been absent from this developing historiography of the war. This is beginning to change, and it is only appropriate that the lead is taken by one of the most accomplished English-language historians of Ukraine, Harvard University’s Serhii Plokhy. […]
In Plokhy’s summary, “Ukraine was divided by history, culture, and the political orientations and instincts of its people as the Russian Federation never was.” Those who imagine a modern democratic nation in 19th-century terms – as a culturally, linguistically and politically united entity – stress all these factors as sources of instability.
Plokhy instead reminds us diversity is good for democracy:
Compromise emerged as the only viable way for the elites to sort out their differences and accommodate one another’s interests […] The country’s regional and cultural diversity, inherited from its long history of rule by foreign empires and states, contributed enormously to the political pluralism of Ukrainian society. […]
Ukraine did not become vulnerable because NATO embraced it and thereby threatened Russia – which, like a toddler deprived of a favourite toy, was obliged to lash out. Rather, it was the opposite. […]
First, Ukraine, which had inherited a good part of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, was pushed by the United States (doing Russia’s bidding) to return its stockpile to Russia.
In exchange, it received economic aid and the beautiful words of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994: Russia, the United Kingdom and the US would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty – and refrain from using military force or economic coercion against the country. These promises, of course, turned out to be worthless. Läs artikel
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