There are two main strategic issues in the Arctic/the High North:
- The Russian strategic deterrence posture and second-strike capability in the Murmansk and Kola areas.
- The Western powers’ defence lines against Russian strategic and attack submarine penetration into the Atlantic to attack the USA and cut off the links with Europe.
In 1969, I wrote a paper for the Swedish Foreign Ministry discussing the Soviet military build-up in the Kola Peninsula. The reasons for the build-up can be found in the Soviet experiences from the Cuba crisis in 1962. The Russians realized that they needed a much stronger deterrence base and a more secure second-strike capability. The build-up was led by the Soviet naval chief Admiral Gorshkov.
During the rest of the Cold War, a sort of balanced strategic deterrence situation existed in the High North. The Russians developed the Murmansk/Kola area into a formidable defence area and into an existential strategic asset for the country
The West, including Norway, conducted anti-submarine reconnaissance in the northern Atlantic and the Barents Sea against the Russians with ASW aircraft, the SONUS system and other means.
There was no real military confrontation between Russia and the US then in this area, but cautious attention. Besides the ASW aircraft a lone American destroyer might appear. British and Dutch marines trained winter warfare in Northern Norway, and the US Marines had stocked materiel for a Marine force in Trondheim, but this was about all.
On the Russian side there were the strategic nuclear submarines, attack submarines, missile systems, strategic bombers but very little army forces in the North. All under control of the Russian Northern Fleet command.
This relatively calm situation has now changed.
The main reason is the Russian attack on Ukraine and the changed geopolitical situation this has caused. While in the past the main line of confrontation between Russia and the US/NATO was at the Fulda Gap in mid-Germany, it has now moved up into the Southern Baltic.
United States which was not present in the Baltic Sea area during the Cold War is now showing a full navy and air force presence there, including with strategic bombers.
In the High North the US is also much more present and active, including by its 2nd Navy and aircraft carriers.
A major new factor is the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. And even more particularly, the fact that in the last few months the US Defence Department has concluded so-called Defence Cooperation Agreements, DCA, with Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. These agreements for 10 years, give the US military unhindered access to 48 military bases in our countries for exercises, rotation of forces, stock-piling and other operations outside Scandinavia: 12 in Norway, 17 in Sweden, 15 in Finland and 4 in Denmark. Several of these bases are in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, that is close to the Russian strategic bases in Murmansk and Kola.
In addition, with the four Nordic countries all in NATO, they can now marshal up to 300 modern fighters, F 35 and Jas Gripen, for operations in the North.
These changes will certainly affect Russian planning. The Leningrad military district has been revived and new army units formed. The coastal defence of the Kola Peninsula has been strengthened.
Thus, there is now a new and more confrontational military situation in the High North. Norway is doing what it can to lower tension but essentially it is a superpower confrontation. There is also renewed tension regarding the Spitsbergen islands.
In short, a few other changes are worth mentioning.
The melting of the Arctic ice favours the Western powers where the Russians earlier reigned unchallenged with their large nuclear ice- breakers. This causes the Russian to strengthen their Bastion defences along the coasts.
There are large economic resources on the Arctic seabed and there is some competition for them, but this is generally regulated by the Law of the Sea conventions. The opening of the Northeast Sea Route is important economically for Russia, and perhaps for China, but I would not attach too much military importance to this.
Overall, the preservation of the Russian deterrence posture and second-strike capability in the Murmansk/Kola area has become much more important to them. It is a real existential issue for the Russian state. The awareness of this in the West may, after all, lead to more cautious policies. However, there is no doubt that tension and the risk of incidents have increased in the Arctic/the High North.
2024-03-07