President Niinistö medverkade i en intervju för tv-kanalen MTV3 på tisdag kväll. Programmet är en ersättning för “Finlandsarenan”, debattveckan i Björneborg som i år är inställd på grund av coronapandemin.

Intervjun handlade huvudsakligen om utrikespolitik och maktbefogenheter. […]

Niinistö upprepade det han sagt tidigare i svenska intervjuer om coronabekämpningen. Finland uppträder helt logiskt, säger presidenten.

– Vi stängde gränsen mellan Nyland och resten av Finland när smittläget var så mycket värre i huvudstadsregionen.

Nu följer Finland samma logik i strategin, när smittläget i Sverige är så mycket annorlunda än här, säger president Niinistö. Han säger sig ha försökt förklara det här många gånger i svenska intervjuer.

– Om de bara stannar upp för ett ögonblick i Sverige och tänker på saken, så förstår de oss nog, säger president Niinistö. Om läget var det motsatta skulle vi kanske också vara lite upprörda, men vi skulle nog förstå om Sverige stängde gränsen för oss.[…]

Niinistö citerade ett utdrag ur kritiken om att presidenten borde hålla sig till utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken och i de frågorna understödja regeringens linjeval.

– Sitter jag verkligen här för att vänta på regeringens linje och sedan säga att jag understöder den? Nej, jag följer grundlagen, sa presidenten. Där står det att Republikens president leder Finlands utrikespolitik i samverkan med statsrådet.

Nu verkar det som om man försöker skriva om grundlagen, så att regeringen och presidenten tillsammans leder utrikespolitiken.[…]

MTV:s reporter frågade om presidenten anser sig censurerad. Niinistö svarade att man ”helt klart försöker lägga munkavle på honom.”[…]

Niinistö tillrättavisade dem som säger att han har motsatt sig EU:s stöd- och stimulanspaket efter coronakrisen.

Niinistö tar inte ställning till paketen, sa han. Men han påpekar att det är tre stora paket under flera år. De bygger på lån eller nytryckta pengar, som kommer ”från intet”.

Samma kritik kom tydligt fram redan under Niinistös “Gullranda-samtal” i maj, och han har inte ändrat åsikt.

Niinistö befarar också att finländarnas inställning till arbete och pengar förändras om man lättvindigt kan låna, utan att ens behöva betala tillbaka sina lån. […]

Han bekräftade att rådgivaren John Boltons memoarer från Vita huset var i stort sett korrekta när det gällde Niinistös samtal med USA:s president Donald Trump. Men det är ovanligt att förtroliga samtal publiceras så snabbt, noterar Niinistö. Och det var inte fråga om att ge några råd åt Trump.

Många i USA ansåg att värdens roll var viktig för framgång vid Putins och Trumps toppmöte i Helsingfors, säger Niinistö nu. Därför ville han berätta hur han har uppfattat och klarat sig med den ryska presidenten, som uppfattas som hård. […]

Han fick också frågan om han har gett Putin någon ordentlig uppläxning för upprepade brott mot mänskliga rättigheter eller demokratin i Ryssland.

– Utskällning/uppläxning är ganska främmande ord för mig. Börjar man med det, är det snabbt det sista samtalet man för med motparten, sa Niinistö.

Men han sa sig ha tagit upp många frågor, till och med ganska modigt.

– Till exempel när jag gratulerade honom till presidentvalet för första gången år 2012, minns Niinistö. Då tog han upp frågan om påstått valfusk. Allt utreds, svarade Putin.

Niinistö verkar ändå inte helt övertygad om det verkligen utreddes. Läs artikel

[…] In 2009, President Sarkozy announced the return to NATO command structures, but only under certain conditions: maintaining nuclear independence and full discretion over France’s contribution to NATO operations; non-participation in a number of jointly funded expenditures agreed upon prior to return, including the fact that no French forces will be placed under NATO permanent command in peacetime. To maintain its nuclear independence, France decided not to join the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which determines the Alliance’s nuclear policy. All of this considered, the country has, therefore, an exceptional position within the organisation […]

The fact that France also has an exceptional position within this framework may undermine defence cooperation. One of the key points is that France is a nuclear state with a peculiar chain of command and a specific concept of strategic autonomy. The 2019 Information Report by French Senators Le Gleut and Conway-Moret (written after six months of field research in several European countries) explains how the French institutional framework and semantics influence the perception of the EU allies. For example, the French idea of strategic autonomy is almost opaque to the other European countries. […]

President Macron has harshly criticised NATO, defining it in “brain death” in an interview given in November, after US President Trump’s repeatedly condemned EU member states efforts to increase their defence collaboration , calling on allies to pledge more resources to the Alliance. According to President Macron, the US stance towards NATO promoted by his counterpart questions the eventual activation of Article 5, especially because the US is pursuing a gradual disengagement from Europe. […]

The divergence of French and US/NATO vital interests seems to have a crucial role here. As the NATO agenda is more and more divergent from the French one (the first one being focused on the Eastern flank of Europe, the second one on the Southern flank), France needs to gradually disengage from NATO if it wants to preserve the capacity to conduct military operations alone. The long-lasting engagement in the Sahel (scarcely supported by NATO allies) and the need to fight terrorism at home put French soldiers and material at risk of overstretch. Furthermore, as US and European countries’ interest diverge, President Macron envisages a ‘window of opportunity’ for convincing several European countries that synergies between France and other Europeans are by nature stronger than US-Europe ties built around alignment to US foreign policy. Läs artikel

The European Union (EU) is preparing counter-measures on China in response to Beijing’s new security law on Hong Kong, the bloc’s top diplomat said on Monday, but envoys stressed the likely steps will not amount to economic sanctions. […]

EU governments could announce national steps separately, but the 27-nation bloc viewed its response as a package to be defined and made reality in coming days, he added.

Finland said it supported the idea of suspending extradition treaties with Hong Kong since the new security law meant detainees could be transferred to mainland China, where courts are controlled by the ruling Communist Party. Läs artikel

Jens Ingvald Olsen mener forsvarsminister Frank Bakke-Jensen har bløffa offentligheten og bagatellisert beredskaps-tilstanden i Norge. […]

Det er nå over 4 år siden den første meldinga kom, våren 2016, om at US Navy (Den amerikanske marine) og Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter (FOH) var i kontakt med Tromsø Havn for å bruke den sivile Grøtsund industrihavn på Tønsnes, like nord for Tromsø bysentrum, som logistikkhavn for amerikanske (atom) reaktordrevne ubåter. På det tidspunktet var undertegnede i politisk ledelse og finansbyråd i Tromsø kommune. Jeg uttalte i intervju i avisa Nordlys at jeg var svært kritisk til disse planene. Særlig ut fra beredskaps- og sikkerhetshensyn mente jeg det var uforsvarlig å ha atomubåter liggende ved sivil kai nær Nord-Norges største by, og kun et par kilometer i luftlinje fra den viktigste helseinstitusjonen i Nord-Norge, UNN. Men også at planene var et ledd i en uønska militær opprustning i nordområdene, og at vi dessuten ikke får vite om ubåtene har atomraketter om bord. […]

I oktober 2018 fremmet Rødt på Stortinget spørsmål til forsvarsminister Frank Bakke-Jensen om risikoen ved den planlagte etableringa på Tønsnes, og om atomubåtene hadde raketter med atomstridshoder. Svaret var uklart, men Bakke-Jensen var klar på at Brattelidoktrinen fra 1975 gjaldt. Hovedinnholdet i Brattelidoktrinen (etter statsminister Trygve Bratteli, AP) er at Norge forutsetter at NATO-allierte ikke har våpen med atomstridshoder når de er i Norge, men at Norge ikke foretar inspeksjoner for å kontrollere at dette overholdes. Läs artikel

Sjefen for det amerikanske marinekorpset har nylig publisert Force Design 2030 som beskriver store organisasjonsendringer. Disse endringene vil få konsekvenser for Norge og Forsvaret bør tilpasses deretter. […]

Det er umulig å fastslå hvor lang tid det vil ta å få alliert forsterkning med dagens struktur og med fremtidens. Det er for mange variabler som situasjon, trussel, politisk og militær beslutningsprosess, og styrker tilgjengelig. Det er stor forskjell på alliert forflytning til Norge som del av en øvelse og i krise eller krig. I fredstid er det relativt enkelt og raskt å komme seg til Norge, selv om ikke hele settet av beredskapslover kan nyttes. I krise og krig kan vår evne til å motta støtte forbedres ved at forskjellige beredskapstiltak iverksettes, slik at det for eksempel ryddes plass på havner og flystriper. Derimot kan den strategiske situasjonen gjøre det vanskeligere. En situasjon der Norge ber om hjelp fra en stormakt vil ikke lenge dreie seg kun om Norge, men om forholdet mellom stormaktene. Både politiske og militære beslutningsprosesser i USA vil derfor dreie seg om amerikansk strategi og i liten grad norsk. En gryende stormaktskonflikt vil også sette press på alle tilgjengelig amerikanske styrker. Selv om USA er verdens største militærmakt er det langt ifra overskudd på styrker. Det vil være en beinhard prioritering av bruk og posisjonering av slike. […]

Det som fremstår relativt klart med denne endringen er at USMC i fremtiden ikke vil komme med landstyrker som sammen med Hæren og NATO skal kunne forsvare områder eller ta tilbake norsk territorium mot russiske landstyrker på norsk jord. Norge blir dermed nødt til å gjøre mer selv og blir mer avhengig av forsterkning fra NATOs reaksjonsstyrker, US Army eller andre nasjoner med bilaterale avtaler. En slik forsterkning vil igjen være avhengig av situasjonen i resten av Europa og om situasjonen tillater forflytning av større landstyrker til Norge. Det er derfor nødvendig at Norge og Forsvaret ser grundig på den utviklingen som skjer i USMC og resten av det amerikanske forsvaret i utviklingen av norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, strategi, forsvarskonsept og strukturutvikling. Med USAs fokus på Kina, Russlands A2/AD kapasiteter og det amerikanske forsvarets endrede konsepter er det ingen tvil om Norge må ha en selvstendig evne til å forsvare landet. Läs artikel

Efter två dagar av våldsamma protester i Mali manar protestledaren till sans. – Lugna er, snälla, säger han i ett videoklipp som publicerats på sociala medier. Sju demonstranter har dödats i de häftigaste regimkritiska protesterna på många år.

Demonstranterna kräver att president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta avgår. Sent i lördags upplöste han landets författningsdomstol i ett försök att blidka protesterna, som ändå fortsatte. Sammanlagt har fyra personer, därav två tonåringar, dött i upploppen som skett i huvudstaden Bamako under helgen. Ytterligare tre hittades döda i fredags. Enligt vittnen har säkerhetsstyrkor skjutit skarpa skott mot demonstranterna. Upploppen har varit som allvarligast runt den moské där imamen Mahmoud Dicko har hållit böner. Dicko har blivit en ledargestalt för proteströrelsen. Nu manar han sina anhängare till lugn. Läs artikel

Corruption and cronyism, weak public services and national leadership, electoral malpractice and the government’s inability to bring an end to inter-communal and jihadist violence have fuelled popular frustration.

Opposition political parties have joined together to organise demonstrations, but theirs has not been the decisive voice that has repeatedly brought tens of thousands out on to the streets in a display of public anger unprecedented for decades – and which has now forced Mr Keïta and his ministers to negotiate. The real mobiliser – the figure who wields the critical crowd pulling power – is an imam, Mahmoud Dicko. […]

And his nationalist sentiments show through when he accuses France of ambitions to re-colonise his country. In that he is like many compatriots – delighted to be rescued back in 2013 but now tiring of a French military operation that has still not managed to shut down the jihadist armed groups. Today it is this populist appeal that makes him such an influential player in the current political crisis. […]

He has been involved in attempts to develop a new dialogue with Ag Ghaly and other jihadist leaders still pursuing the armed struggle, an avenue that Mr Keïta is also attempting to pursue. Läs artikel

[…] The Baltic states have also voiced concerns about the deployment of Russian weapons and troops close to the Baltic states’ borders with Russia, as well as Russia’s nuclear build-up, including renovations of weapons storage facilities in its exclave of Kaliningrad. Russia has built up forces in its Western Military District, which encompasses the Baltic states’ border regions, most recently adding an air defense missile regiment to its capabilities. There is also evidence suggesting that the Western Military District has upgraded some of its tactical capabilities, and has re-established the 1st Guards Tank Army in the district, which includes modernized main battle tanks and represents the first new Russian tank army formed since 1991. In addition, the Russian Navy’s Baltic Sea Fleet is headquartered in Kaliningrad, which borders the Baltics. […]

In addition to deploying and demonstrating military assets on its own territory adjacent to the Baltic states, Russia also maintains ties to Russian-speaking communities in these states, which the Kremlin undoubtedly also views as assets in its strategy to retain influence in the region. Latvia has the largest contingent of those identifying as ethnic Russians, with around 35 percent, while Estonia has 29 percent and Lithuania has the fewest, at around 6 percent. The issue of grey passport holders—where citizenship was not automatically granted to ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia upon the collapse of the Soviet Union—has complicated progress on integrating Russian speaking communities there. Moscow has taken advantage of these complications to position itself as the defender of Russian speakers in the region. Among other things, Russia has criticized Estonia and Latvia for not granting automatic citizenship to their large Russian-speaking minorities, maintaining that all three Baltic states have passed restrictive laws limiting the public use of the Russian language. […]

Energy supplies account for much of the Russian-Baltic trade. When it comes to oil, the first half of 2019 saw Estonia and Lithuania import over 75 percent of their oil from Russia, while Latvia imported significantly less, with only up to 25 percent of its oil imports coming from Russia. The Baltics also used to import most of their gas from Russia. For instance, in the first half of 2019, Estonia and Latvia received more than 75 percent of their natural gas imports from Russia’s Gazprom, while Lithuania received 50-75 percent. In addition to selling gas, Gazprom used to own significant stakes in all three of the Baltic states’ main gas companies: 37 percent of Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujos, 47 percent of Estonia’s Eesti Gaas and 50 percent of Latvia’s Latvijas Gaze as of 2013. This gave Gazprom, and by extension Russia, a significant say in the Baltics’ gas policies. […]

Russia’s shifting economic relationship with the Baltic states appears to be reflective of some of its own economic security concerns. Russia is keen to avoid depending on NATO member states for trade and is wary of its reliance on Baltic ports to handle cargo. As oil prices, upon which the ruble largely depends, remain depressed, and projected economic growth in Russia is set to remain at just 1.8 percent in 2021, Russia is increasingly reluctant to pay the Baltics for using the region’s ports for exports of oil. Läs artikel

[…] Russia and China are now viewed as strategic competitors by the United States. There are increased levels of Russian military activity in the Arctic, new Arctic Ocean sea routes such as the Northern Sea Route above Russia are opening with accompanying strategic issues, and the vast Arctic energy and raw material resources remain to be exploited. […]

Still, cooperation proceeded on issues related to Arctic sustainable development, health and wellbeing, and biodiversity. A new interstate agreement was signed on scientific cooperation (2015), a polar code for Arctic shipping was reached through the International Maritime Organization (2017) and a Central Arctic Oceans Fisheries Agreement was signed in 2018 to preclude commercial fishing in this region until science provided guidance. […]

Despite these successes, the most serious signal of declining Arctic Council cooperation and consensus was the failure (largely attributed to U.S. objections about the inclusion of language on climate change) of the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting to reach an agreement last year in Rovaniemi, Finland on a Ministerial Declaration, a first since the Council inception in 1996.

The Arctic is the highest priority strategic national interest of Russia. Arctic oil and gas resources are essential to Russia’s economic future as is the defense of its territory along its four-thousand-kilometer Arctic coastline. Key military assets protect its second-strike nuclear capability based on the Kola Peninsula. Russia has refurbished Soviet-era air and naval installations and built new ones, augmented troop presence and conducted extensive maneuvers, installed modern radar and electronic warfare capabilities and developed a new overarching Arctic military command. Moscow argues these are defensive measures to deter possible Western threats to Russian sovereignty and protect the Northern Sea Route and its Arctic resources. […]

The United States has responded with its own military maneuvers,  plans to add six icebreakers to its very limited fleet and at last year’s Arctic Council Ministerial, Secretary of State Pompeo introduced hard security issues as he sharply criticized the Russian military buildup and charged Russia and China with aggressive intentions in the Arctic. Läs artikel