The leaders emphasise that the G5 Sahel States held primary responsibility for creating the security conditions necessary for the redeployment of State administrations and services. The settlement of disputes over access to and use of natural resources is also the responsibility of the states of the region and should be considered as a significant tool for reducing local conflicts linked in particular to pastoralism. In this respect, the continued implementation by all actors of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process remains a priority. […]

Welcoming the significant efforts made by all parties since 2013, the leaders solemnly call for a renewed and increased commitment to the Sahel. They underline the centrality of the UN’s efforts and coordination role, including the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and its Support Plan, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN Office for West Africa. They recall the African Union’s coordinating role in silencing the guns and bringing peace to the continent. […]

The G5 Sahel States commit themselves to make the G5 Sahel Joint Force fully operational, welcome the EU’s support mobilised to this effect and call on other partners to join it. They point out the crucial need for predictable, sustained and flexible support in the procedures. The Heads of State reiterate their appeal to the UN Security Council that the G5 Sahel Joint Force be placed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and benefit from permanent funding. […]

They welcome the involvement of several EU Member States in the Takuba task force. They invite the other EU Member States to join this initiative. Läs uttalandet

A soldier engaged within the ranks of the French military injured in Mali within the explosion of an improvised explosive machine, died of his accidents.

[…] Germany’s struggle to decide on a successor for its aging Tornado fighter aircraft truly is a story that keeps on giving. Since the 2000s, the Eurofighter has assumed many of the old workhorse’s functions, but some of the 85 remaining Tornados still provide the capability to carry forward-deployed US nuclear bombs. In doing so, they facilitate Germany’s contribution to nuclear burden sharing in NATO. […]

Nuclear disarmament is not an invalid political goal – it is enshrined in international law no less. But were German politics in the coming years to move in this direction and fail to replace the Tornado, it could put the fundamentals of the European security order under great pressure. […]

Germany abandoning its dual-capable aircraft could even mark the beginning of the end for nuclear burden sharing in NATO. Public opinion in the three other countries that contribute dual-capable aircraft to the nuclear mission – Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands – is even less enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence than it is in Germany. If Germany were to quit, such allies may eventually follow suit. In turn, other NATO members with more favourable views of nuclear deterrence, like Poland or Romania, might seek bilateral agreements with the US to satisfy their security needs. Either way, the alliance’s deterrence and defence posture would become even more beholden to Washington. Läs artikel

Försvarsmaktens verksamhet är beroende av en fungerande materiel- och logistikförsörjning. Covid-19 och de restriktioner som införts påverkar näringslivets produktion och varuflöden. Detta riskerar i förlängningen att påverka leveranserna av varor och tjänster till Försvarsmakten.

The UK is sending 250 soldiers to Mali to join the UN peacekeeping mission in 2020. The UN mission has been described as one of the most dangerous in the world: over 200 peacekeepers have been killed since it began in 2013.

The deployment is in response to increasing insecurity in the wider Sahel region in west Africa. The Government adopted a new strategic approach to Africa in 2018 with a focus on the Sahel. The UK already provides logistical support to a French counter-terrorism operation in Mali and supports the regional G5 Sahel group’s efforts to combat Islamist groups.

The political situation in Mali is fragile and complex following a coup in 2012. Implementation of a 2015 peace agreement remains tentative. Beyond the rise of Islamist and other armed groups, there are also concerns about the impact of climate change, developmental challenges and a worsening humanitarian crisis. […]

A Times editorial said it will be “Britain’s most significant deployment to an active war zone since the end of a mission in Afghanistan five years ago”. The newspaper also reported concerns among senior British personnel about the complexity of the situation in Mali and the number of deaths of French and UN peacekeepers.

MINUSMA has been described as “one of the most dangerous peacekeeping missions in Africa” and has one of the highest fatality rates of the 13 UN peacekeeping missions currently operating around the world. The UK already provides logistical support to a French counter-terrorism operation in Mali and supports the regional G5 Sahel group’s efforts to combat Islamist groups. The deployment to MINUSMA is separate to this. Läs artikel

Mange, også ganske mange av oss i Høyre, satte kaffen i halsen da langtidsplan for Forsvaret ble lagt fram 17. april. I lys av den mildt sagt urovekkende situasjonen i verden er planen langt fra det vi hadde sett for oss. Og langt fra det eneste alternativet som, ifølge forsvarssjefen, kan møte våre sikkerhetsmessige utfordringer på en tilstrekkelig adekvat måte: Det såkalte alternativ A fra hans fagmilitære råd (FMR) framlagt høsten 2019. Regjeringen har spurt forsvarssjefen om råd. Og de velger å ikke følge rådet! […]

NATO-øvelsen Trident Juncture høsten 2018 viste at det norske forsvar ikke har kapasitet til både å holde en forsvarskamp gående etter at et angrep på landet er innledet og samtidig evne å sikre mottak av allierte styrker som etter NATO-traktatens §5 i en slik situasjon skal komme oss til unnsetning. Forsvaret er rett og slett blitt for lite! Dette er et avgjørende og dramatisk faktum som alene bør være tilstrekkelig grunn for å velge alternativ A fra forsvarssjefens fagmilitære råd.

Under framleggelsen av LTP, utalte forsvarsministeren at «… (vi) også vedtar en risiko». Problemet er at risikoen er stor, og i potten ligger vår eksistens som nasjon. Og alt tyder på at verden bare blir et enda mer utrygt sted i løpet av de ganske mange årene det vil ta å bygge opp igjen et tilstrekkelig godt forsvar. Läs artikel

U.S. lawmakers are pushing our military to stay in the Sahel to help the French, who have failed to pacify the region for decades.

s the coronavirus swept through American cities in early March, a small group in Congress focused on a different threat. For these lawmakers, despite the clear magnitude of the crisis, distant conflicts in West Africa – not pandemic preparations at home – were the priority. To make their point, the bipartisan band introduced legislation aimed at restricting the Pentagon from removing U.S. troops from the region this year.

The most fervent among them, Senator Lindsey Graham, threatened Secretary of Defense Mark Esper if he follows through with a widely reported AFRICOM drawdown, which Esper and other officials believe is necessary to refocus the Pentagon’s resources on China. “I can make your life hell,” Graham reportedly told Esper. […]

Many of the several thousand U.S. troops in the region support an ongoing French military effort to combat insurgent offshoots of al Qaeda and the Islamic State. But after a 2013 intervention in Mali that was forecasted to last mere months, France is bogged down in the Sahel, and the violence has worsened. Several weeks ago, Boko Haram militants killed nearly 100 Chadian soldiers in a pre-dawn ambush, and another insurgent assault in Mali last week took the lives of dozens of government troops in that country’s restive northern region. […]

In the face of a global pandemic and a potentially unprecedented economic freefall, pacifying West Africa should be the last thing on the minds of U.S. policymakers. America spent two decades, thousands of lives, and over $6 trillion in failed nation-building efforts in places once deemed vital to U.S. interests. If France wants to relearn past lessons in a place that is decidedly unimportant to Americans, let us wish her luck. Läs artikel

Läs även kommentar tidigare här på sajten om Sveriges deltagande i Frankrikes krig i Sahel.

A strategy for the joint use of nuclear weapons is the best guarantee of security, said NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.  Germany plans to purchase F-18 fighter jets in the US, which will be used as part of this strategy, Deutsche Welle reported.

In a discussion around Germany’s procurement of new US warplanes, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the importance of a joint nuclear weapons strategy.

This strategy is the best guarantee of security, this is NATO’s nuclear deterrence, he told DPA on Tuesday. […]

A nuclear weapons sharing strategy brings together some partners, he said referring to the actions in the nuclear field, in which some partners provide aircraft, logistics, and support, while others provide weapons systems. All this together provides NATO with nuclear deterrence, he added welcoming in this regard the German intention to purchase new fighters from the US. […]

During the Cold War, the US deployed a significant number of nuclear warheads in Western Europe. After 1991, most of them were taken out, but about 150 bombs remain on the continent and are stored in various countries, including Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey.

The base of the 33rd tactical squadron of the German Air Force is located in Büchel in western Germany. If necessary, German pilots on Tornado aircraft could deliver American bombs to the target. This strategy for sharing nuclear weapons is part of the NATO program, which includes Germany and the US. Läs artikel

Utrikesminister Guðlaug­ur Þór Þórðar­son argumenterade inför regeringen för att hamnen i Helguvík skulle byggas ut för att kunna ta emot större Nato-fartyg. Men förslaget fick inte gehör. Statsminister Katrín Jakobsdóttir motsätter sig utbyggnaden. Guðlaug­ur Þór Þórðar­son har dock inte gett upp om förslaget.

Bygget av hamnen i Helguvík klubbades 1983 efter ett avtal mellan Island och Nato. Nato finansierade stora delar av bygget i gengäld mot att hamnen kunde användas för bränsletransporter till den dåvarande basen i Keflavík. Det första fartyget angjorde Helguvík sommaren 1989. […]

Statsminister Katrín Jakobsdóttir backade inte upp förslaget under regeringssammanträdet. Hon säger till Eyjan att coronakrisen inte påverkar Islands utrikespolitik. Regeringen har inte beslutat om någon utbyggnad av Natos anläggningar utöver de arbeten som nu pågår på flygplatsen i Keflavík. Läs artikel

[…] For an organization whose primary mission is collective security in the North Atlantic area, the Black Sea is a very important region for the North Atlantic Security Organization (NATO). This region forms the southeastern frontier of NATO’s area of responsibility. Thanks to Russia’s actions in the region, there are more miles of coastline under illegal military occupation along the Black Sea than in any other place in the world. […]

The 1936 Montreux Convention makes maintaining a robust NATO maritime presence difficult. The convention gave Turkey control over the Turkish Straits. As a NATO member, Turkey controlling the straits is not, in itself, a problem. However, the convention also placed limitations on the number, transit time, and tonnage of naval ships from non–Black Sea countries that may use the strait and operate in the Black Sea. Non–Black Sea state warships in the Straits must be less than 15,000 tonnes. No more than nine non–Black Sea state warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of no more than 30,000 tons, may pass at any one time, and they are permitted to stay in the Black Sea for no longer than 21 days. This places limitations on non–Black Sea NATO member operations in the Black Sea.

The second issue that frustrates NATO’s approach to the region is a difference in point of view by the Alliance’s Black Sea members. Romania is perhaps the most enthusiastic about increasing NATO’s presence in the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey, which has the most capable navy among the Alliance’s Black Sea members, sees the region as more of a national issue and not a NATO one. Therefore Turkey, as the controller and guarantor of the Turkish Straits under the 1936 Montreux convention, is always cautious, hesitant, and at times suspicious of any great NATO initiatives for the Black Sea. Läs artikel