The adoption of secondary sanctions is commonly associated with United States policy, specifically with the adoption of comprehensive sanctions regimes against countries such as Iran or Cuba. These unilateral measures not only aim to impact the relations between the United States and the targeted States, but moreover seek to restrict trade interactions between third States and third-State operators, on the one hand, and the targeted countries and their respective companies, on the other hand. The rationale is clear. It is an effort to maximize the sanctions impact vis-à-vis the targeted countries with a view to achieving the underlying policy objectives of the sanctioning state – even if these objectives are not always clearly articulated. Relatedly, secondary sanctions seek to prevent that trade flows simply relocate, and to avoid, for instance, that US operators forced to terminate existing trade relations with the targeted country see the resulting vacuum filled by companies from other countries. At the same time, the legitimacy and legality of secondary sanctions have been widely questioned throughout the international community – adding a further layer to the lingering schism between the west and the global south regarding the place within the international legal order of ‘unilateral coercive measures’ and ‘third-party countermeasures’.
Thus, previous chapters in this volume have, for instance, critically examined the compatibility of secondary sanctions with the customary principle of non-intervention, the rules restricting States’ exercise of jurisdiction, or international trade law. The European Union has long voiced its opposition to US secondary sanctions. Towards the end of 1981, the United States introduced a series of export restrictions aimed at undermining the construction of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline. Specifically, these restrictions encompassed the trade of goods and technical data related to the exploration, exploitation, transmission, and refining of oil and gas destined for the Soviet Union.2 In June 1982, the US decided to amend its trade control, broadening their reach to incorporate the export and re-export of such items via foreign subsidiaries of US corporations (including non-US origin items), foreign companies, or individuals (restricted to US items), and foreign goods manufactured under licenses granted by US companies. In response to these amendments, the European Community, the predecessor to the EU, raised objections to the measures, asserting that ‘the US regulations as amended contain sweeping extensions of US jurisdiction which are unlawful under international law’. Läs artikel