[…] The war has also revealed the limitations of British military strength. The UK’s Armed Forces lack the necessary mass, resilience and coherence to respond to prolonged, high-intensity conflict. This also limits their deterrent effect. Years of strategic neglect have left our forces stretched thin and limited in size. It is often said that the UK does not require the same number of land forces as its continental partners due to its geographical location and that, in a conflict with Russia, Germany, Poland and Finland would provide ground forces. But this is incorrect. In the event of a war with Russia, we would have to be prepared to deploy soldiers in support of Nato.
Further, Ukraine has repeatedly suffered attacks on its critical national infrastructure, from power lines to hospitals. This will likely be a feature of future conflicts. Safeguarding and repairing our critical national infrastructure requires organised manpower, but at present, we are not equipped to field the troops, equipment, and supplies needed for a sustained war effort or to protect critical national infrastructure at home.
Much of this vulnerability stems from a military structure designed around the assumption that modern conflicts will be brief, rather than protracted. The size of the British Army, for example, is inadequate for longer-term fighting. Recruitment and retention have become increasingly challenging. Our Reserves remain an underutilised asset that could help build much-needed mass, but only if the government properly funds and defines their role. Läs artikel