So the negotiators wrote into the treaties the fullest measure of commitment that their domestic legal and political systems would allow – which was zero. They rejected swift and sure deterrence in favor of the right to decide – to weigh the facts of each incident, to judge whether an armed attack actually had occurred, to assess whether the attack had been provoked, to determine whether a military response was the most propitious, to consider all the factors that go into an evaluation of what action is most appropriate. The United States promised that it would, in good faith, consider such assistance as it deemed appropriate if another party is attacked. But that is all it promised.
In mutual security treaties to which the United States is a party, the notion of commitment is a myth. To pretend otherwise is to undermine the very constitutional processes that the treaties were intended to preserve.
Citatet är hämtat från United States Mutual Security Treaties: The Commitment Myth, Professor of International Law Michael J. Glennon, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 24, 1986