”On the other hand, Russia lacks the power and capability of the Soviet Union to conquer the majority of Eastern Europe. It frankly cannot even occupy the entirety of Ukraine. The strategy of Moscow therefore reflects one of weakening and dividing, to prevent further loss of power in the region. In short, Russia’s fundamental aim appears to be the prevention of Ukraine and Georgia from joining any Western security architecture, which would in one swift move decouple Moscow’s supply chains, buffer zones, and naval ports and military bases in Europe. Unwilling to risk any military intervention or occupation, Moscow’s favored strategy therefore seems to be either punitive deterrence (with Georgia) or frozen conflict and proxy wars (with Ukraine). This further demonstrates the lack of capability and intention of Russia being an expansionist power. While Russia’s intention toward Ukraine and Georgia is undoubtedly hostile, it is still guided by a narrow strategic realism. Russia understands that losing Georgia and Ukraine would result in Russia being a non-actor in the European balance of power. Moscow has so far taken every possible action to neutralize that scenario. Moscow has also not attempted any continued expansion westward, like the Soviet Union did in the 1940s. However, one might judge Russia ideologically, a power-maximizing expansionist it is not.”
Sumantra Maitra: The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power?